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Appellee/Defendant Community Nursing Services (XNS"), by and through its
undersigned counsel of record, hereby files this Brief in opposition to the appeal filed by
Plaintiff (hereafter "Plaintiff") in the above-captioned matter.
JURISDICTION
Assuming that Plaintiff timely filed a Notice of Appeal, an issue addressed in more
di

§ 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
This appeal presents the following issues for resolution by this Court:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in entering an Order and Judgment on

December 23, 1994 dismissing Plaintiffs Complaints which sought to hold CNS liable in tort
for absolutely privileged statements it made during the course of an EEOC investigation.1
iindii.T i i l ' i i p p e a l . 2

2.

W l i t l h t T P h i n l i t l liitifh

3.

Whether Plaintiff should be held liable for costs on this appeal.

II'IMI | I , T

' I he first issue is a legal issue that this C :»! u t re1' ric * s for correctness w ithout
deference to the summary judgment ruling of the trial court. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Cahoon
1

By its own express terms, Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal is clearly limited to seeking
review of the Order and Judgment dated December 23, 1994 (Addendum "E"). Thus, this
Court has not been asked to determine whether the trial court acted properly in denying
various post-judgment motions filed by Plaintiff. These post-judgment motions are discussed
below in the section outlining the course of the proceedings before the trial court.
2

This issue was first raised with this Court when CNS filed a Motion for Summary
Disposition on March 3, 1995. The Court denied this Motion in an Order dated June 21,
1995. To the extent that this issue can still be raised during the course of the normal appeal
processes, CNS does so here and presents its argument later in this brief. To the extent this
issue has been finally resolved by the Order dated June 21, 1995, counsel for CNS
apologizes in advance for presenting this argument again.
131367.1

and Maxfield Irrigation Co.. 879 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah 1994). The second and third issues
relate to the appeal itself and were not part of the trial court proceedings.
NATURE OF THE CASE
In this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on CNS for statements that are
absolutely privileged because they were allegedly made during the course of a judicial or quasijudicial proceeding, specifically an investigation by the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") into an age discrimination charge Plaintiff filed. The
EEOC ruled in favor of CNS on this charge. A true and correct copy of the EEOC's decision
(which was also presented to the trial court below) is attached hereto as Addendum "A."
Because the statements at issue are absolutely privileged, Plaintiffs claims are not actionable,
were properly dismissed by the trial court. This Court should affirm that ruling.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
After she was discharged by CNS for performance issues, Plaintiff filed an age
discrimination charge with the EEOC. During the course of investigating this charge, the
EEOC spoke to several current and former employees of CNS. On August 30, 1994, the
EEOC issued a written Determination and Right to Sue letter stating there was no reasonable
cause to conclude Plaintiff had been the victim of discrimination. The Right to Sue letter
stated, Following this dismissal, the Charging Party may only pursue this matter by filing
suit against the Respondent named in the charge within 90 days of the receipt of this letter.
Otherwise, the Charging Party's right to sue will be lost." (See Addendum "A") (emphasis in
original).

131367 1
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Instead of filing such a discrimination lawsuit, however, on or about October 12,
1994,

.idling pui se,

Loss and Severe Emotional and Physical Stress for: Defamation of Personal and Professional
d,
"Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants for defamation of personal and professional
character

October I <K l*>*.M, !l: ILiintilt filed an amendment to this

'

Complaint stating, "Plaintiff charges Defendant with making defamatory remarks...." Record at
K

Addendum

M

C")

On their face, both Complaints plainly sought to impose defamation

liability on CNS for statements allegedly made during the EEOC investigation.
On November 1, 1994, CNS filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary
Jud^nK'nt

I?!*! fifij ,|i \H SI"1

H i e h i it liini \\\\s Miii|iiH| IL i ifi n ( ' h j 1 . \\ m. 'i|h\(il i l l

|n 11 |l|»(H"il

from AV\ alleged defamation liability for statements allegedly made during the course of the
: ;

^

<*

* -

::tei mination (Addendi n n " " ") to

LI-J iva ^ urt as an exhibit • • ! * , <

< r.
ititjunciit i pposmy i 'NS' ninln ii and

entitled "Motion to Deny Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment Requested by Defendant and
Grant Summary Judgment to Plaintiff." Record at 59-82.

11te trial court held a hearing on all

these matters on December 12, 1994 and took them under advisement.
Later that same day, the trial court issued a minute entry treating CNS' motion as a
request for summary judgment, granting summary judgment "for the reasons specified in the
supporting memoranda" and requesting CNS' counsel to prepare an order and judgment.
Recor J i 1 93 (Addendum "h"!
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1
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3

nil • n m il ,nnl n i t n n l in I >iiIi• i

and Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Complaints because the statements allegedly made by CNS
were absolutely privileged. Record at 119-21 (Addendum "E").
In the meantime, Plaintiff filed a pleading dated December 20, 1994, asking the court
to reverse its judgment and to add the following claims to the Complaints which had already
been dismissed by the order contained in the minute entry:
•

"Plaintiff charges Defendant with perjury under oath, violation of Utah
Code Ann. sec. 76-8-504 and sec. 76-8-504." [written in hand above:
"76-8-502"].

•

"Plaintiff charges Defendant with communication fraud, violation of
Utah Code, [sic] Ann. sec. 76-10-1801."

•

"The defamation of the Plaintiffs character was committed by perjury
under oath and was done for the purpose of obtaining a decision from
the EEOC in their favor...."

•

"Plaintiff charges Defendant with the tort of outrage...."

Record at 100-15 (emphasis in original). On or about December 22, 1994, CNS filed a
memorandum in opposition to this Motion. Record at 116-17.
On or about December 30, 1994, Plaintiff filed another motion to "Reverse
Judgment" and "Amend Complaint," replacing the previous motion seeking to add the same
claims discussed above and asking for oral argument. Record at 126-31 (Addendum "F"). On
or about January 5, 1995, the court denied the request for oral argument on this Motion and
indicated it would rule on it when properly submitted for decision. Record at 132-33.
On or about January 9, 1995, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Request for
Decision." See Addendum "G."3

Rather than merely submitting her motion for decision,

3

Counsel for CNS could not locate any reference to this pleading in the record index
prepared by the trial court.
131367.1
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however, for the first time, Plaintiff explained in detail that she was seeking to add not only the
new claims outlined above, but also an age discrimination claim based on the original EEOC
charge. CNS objected to the same and filed a memorandum in support of this objection.
Record at 134-40.
The court denied Plaintiffs Motion in a minute entry dated January 12, 1995.
Record at 141-42. On or about January 13, 1995, Plaintiff filed a reply to the objections filed
by CNS, Record at 144-47, as well as her own objection to what she termed a "hasty decision"
made by the court on the motion she herself had already submitted for decision on January 9,
1995. Record at 143.
Bending over backwards to be fair to Plaintiff, on January 18, 1995 the trial court
issued a minute entry setting aside its previous minute entry of January 12, 1995 and indicating
the matter would be ruled on when submitted for decision. Record at 150-51. On or about
January 20, 1995, Plaintiff again submitted for decision her motion to "Reverse Judgment" and
"Amended Complaint". Record at 152-53. In a minute entry dated January 26, 1995, the trial
court denied Plaintiffs' Motion "for the reasons specified in Defendant's responding
memorandum." Record at 154-55. The court signed an Order to the same effect on February
8, 1995. Record at 156-57 (Addendum "H").
On or about February 22, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the final
Judgment entered by the court on December 23, 1994. Record at 159-61 (Addendum "I").
This Notice was filed fully 61 days after the final Judgment appealed from was entered. In a
Motion for Summary Disposition filed March 3, 1995, CNS sought dismissal of this matter on
the merits and because Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed two months after the entry of final

131367.1
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judgment and thus the appeal was not timely and this Court had no jurisdiction over the same.
In an Order dated June 21, 1995, this Court denied this Motion and ordered the Parties to
follow the normal appeal process.4

4

As noted above under the Statement of Issues section, to the extent this issue of
timeliness can still be raised as part of this appeal, CNS now does so and provides the
following brief statement of why it believes jurisdiction is lacking and why this appeal can
and should be dismissed for this reason alone.
The failure to timely file a notice of appeal means that an appellate court has no
jurisdiction over the appeal. Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah 1983); Bowen v.
Riverton City, 656 P. 2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982); Bureers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321-22
(Utah 1982). As Plaintiff concedes in her Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement here,
the final judgment in this case was entered on December 23, 1995. Both the Notice of
Appeal and Docketing Statement expressly indicate that it is this December 23, 1995 final
judgment from which Plaintiff appeals.
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that an appeal must be
brought within thirty (30) days of "the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from." Thus, Plaintiffs deadline to file an appeal from the final judgment was January 23,
1995. Plaintiff missed this deadline by a substantial amount of time; her Notice of Appeal
was filed February 22, 1995, fully sixty-one (61) days after the entry of final judgment.
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the time to file a notice of
appeal to be tolled only under specific, limited circumstances, namely the filing of a motion
for judgment under Rule 50(b), to amend or make additional findings under Rule 52(b) or
Rule 59, or for a new trial under Rule 59. None of those circumstances exists here.
Plaintiff filed post-judgment motions to "Reverse Judgment" and "Amend Complaint"
and the memoranda in support of these motions consisted largely of pleas for reconsideration,
re-argument of the issues previously resolved by the trial court and statements in support of
her allegation that she should be able to assert criminal and other claims. None of these
motions should serve to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 4(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure plainly do not allow the filing of a motion to
amend a complaint to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Thus, the only question is
whether Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration tolls this time period. It does not.
(continued...)
131367.1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because CNS moved to dismiss this matter below, it properly assumed, for the
purposes of that motion, only that the facts stated in the Complaints were true. CNS submitted
only the EEOC Determination for consideration beyond the pleadings. Accordingly, there are
no factual or background matters to discuss with this Court that have not already been addressed
above.

4

(...continued)
None of the circumstances allowing tolling exist here. Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure allows a party to seek a judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict. Plaintiff
here made no such motion nor could she, as there was no jury verdict to seek to overturn.
Rule 52(b) allows a party to move to amend a judgment and/or add additional
findings. Plaintiffs motions did no such thing and rather simply sought for the trial court to
completely change its mind and reverse its decision. Furthermore, there were no factual
findings to amend, as the trial court ruled as a matter of law against Plaintiffs claims.
Finally, Rule 59 allows a party to seek a new trial. Plaintiffs motion could not
possibly have been made pursuant to Rule 59 as there was no trial in the first place.
Plaintiffs motion was, at best, not one for a new trial but one for a "new summary
judgment" asking the court to change its mind. In Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), because a motion captioned "motion for reconsideration" of a
summary judgment ruling was essentially treated by the trial court as a motion for a new
trial, the Court ruled that the time for filing a notice of appeal was tolled. JdL at 1064-65.
Plaintiffs motion to "Reverse Judgment" here was not treated as a new trial motion, and in
fact, the Order denying it specifically stated that the motion was treated as a motion for
reconsideration. See Order dated February 8, 1995 (See Addendum "G"). If Plaintiffs
motion to "Reverse Judgment" here tolls the appeal time, every motion for reconsideration,
and every "hey-Judge-please-change-your-mind" motion must be held to do so. They will
then be filed after every dispositive order in the trial courts, something at odds with the clear
intent of the applicable rules that only certain post-judgment motions toll the time to file a
notice of appeal.
Thus, there was no tolling under Rule 4(b) of Plaintiffs time to file a notice of
appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiffs appeal is not timely and should be dismissed.
131367.1

7

Plaintiff evidences a chronic inability to understand that CNS admitted the facts
alleged in her Complaints solely for the purposes of its Motion to Dismiss, a point CNS
expressly stated in its pleadings and in oral argument. (See, e.g., partial transcript of argument
attached hereto as Addendum "J"). CNS has denied Plaintiffs allegations all along, but moved
for dismissal because even if Plaintiffs allegations are true, she cannot prevail.5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on CNS for statements she alleges its witnesses
made during an EEOC investigation. Because any such statements made during this quasijudicial proceeding are absolutely privileged, Plaintiffs claims are not actionable.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED PLAINTIFF FROM SEEKING
TO IMPOSE LIABILITY FOR STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE DURING
A JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
The essence of Plaintiffs lawsuit against CNS, despite her numerous attempts to

redefine it each time it was rejected by the trial court, has been to try to impose some type of
tort liability on CNS for statements allegedly made about her during the course of responding to
the discrimination charge she filed with the EEOC. This is obvious from a cursory review of
her Complaint and Amended Complaints, as well as from the statement of issues on pp. 2-3 of

5

Plaintiffs endless harping on this point and unfounded accusations of criminal or
unprofessional conduct related to the same are completely distorted, unfounded, inappropriate
and should not be tolerated, even from a pro se litigant. Equally disturbing are Plaintiffs
unprovoked attacks against Judge Frederick, who conducted himself with professionalism and
dignity (and with great, if undeserved, patience toward Plaintiff) throughout this process. It
certainly is Plaintiffs right to disagree with the results to date of this litigation. It is not her
right, however, to litigate this appeal by way of insults and ugly, meritless accusations. She
should be sanctioned for such conduct.
131367.1
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her Docketing Statement. Thus, no matter how she attempts to reframe her lawsuit (and she
tried to do so quite often before the trial court), as a matter of law there is no basis for
imposing any liability on CNS under these circumstances because these alleged statements are
privileged.
It is well-established that there is an absolute privilege from liability for statements
made during the course of judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts. §§ 587-588 (1977) (hereafter cited as "Restatement"):6 Prosser
and Keeton on Torts, § 114, pp. 816-819 (1984) (hereafter cited as "Prosser"). This privilege
"is based upon the public interest in according to all men the utmost freedom of access to the
courts of justice for the settlement of their private disputes." Restatement § 587, comment (a).
The privilege applies to any sort of judicial or administrative proceeding, in any of the branches
of government, where a type of judicial function is performed. Id. at § 585, comment (c);
Prosser. at § 114, pp. 818-819.

6

Restatement Section 587 states:
A party to a private litigation or a private prosecutor or defendant in a
criminal prosecution is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter
concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as a part of,
a judicial proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has some
relation to the proceeding.
Restatement Section 588 states:
A witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter
concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding or as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he is testifying,
if it has some relation to the proceeding.

131367.1
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Utah follows this rule of law. See Allen v. Ortez. 802 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1990). Utah
has also codified an absolute privilege into its statutory law. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 45-2-3(2),
45-2-10(2)7
In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court relied on both the Restatement and Prosser as
discussed above and stated:
One of the absolute privileges is that granted to participants in judicial
proceedings. The general rule is that judges, jurors, witnesses, litigants and
counsel in judicial proceedings have an absolute privilege against
defamation, [citations omitted] This privilege is premised on the
assumption that the integrity of the judicial system requires that there be
free and open expression by all participants and that this will only occur if
they are not inhibited by the risk of subsequent defamation suits, [citations
omitted].

7

Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3(2) states:
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall not be considered as
libelous or slanderous per se, is one made:
(2) In any publication or broadcast of or any statement made in
any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any other official
proceeding authorized by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-10(2) states:
A privileged broadcast which shall not be considered as libelous,
slanderous, or defamatory per se, is one made:
(2) In any broadcast of or any statement made in any legislative
or judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding
authorized by law.

131367.1
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Id. at 1311. Of course, an absolute privilege means there is no cause of action regardless of
whether the statements at issue are true or false. See, e ^ , Williams v. Standard Examiner
Pub. Co.. 27 P.2d 1, 13 (Utah 1933).
The Utah Supreme Court in Allen outlined three elements necessary to any successful
claim of absolute privilege:
First, the statement must have been made during or in the course of a
judicial proceeding, [footnote omitted]. Second, the statement must have
some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding, [citation omitted].
Finally, the one claiming the privilege must have been acting in the capacity
of a judge, juror, witness, litigant or counsel in the proceedings at the time
of the alleged defamation.
802 P.2d at 1312-13. As the trial court properly found here, all three of these criteria are
satisfied in the case at hand.
First, on its face, Plaintiffs initial Complaints plainly allege that the statements at
issue were made during the course of the EEOC proceedings and thus this fact is not disputed.
See Record at 2-3, 10-13 (Addenda "B" and "C").
Second, the matters at issue go to why Plaintiff was terminated from her employment
with CNS and whether these were the true reasons or a pretext for alleged discrimination,
essential inquiries in any EEOC investigation. See e.g.. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.
411 U.S. 792 (1973); Branson v. Price River Coal Co.. 627 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Utah 1986)
affd 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1988). Thus, the alleged statements at issue clearly had some
reference to the EEOC proceedings.
Finally, it is not disputed that Plaintiffs initial Complaint attributes the statements to
CNS, which was clearly a litigant in the EEOC matter. See Record at 2-3, 10-13 (Addenda

131367.1
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M

B" and "C"). Moreover, the persons who presented evidence on behalf of CNS were

witnesses. Thus, the absolute privilege as outlined in Allen applies here.
The same result has been reached in very similar cases involving EEOC proceedings.
See Thomas v. Petrulis. 465 N.E.2d 1059 (111. Ct. App. 1984); Hurst v. Farmer. 697 P.2d 280
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985), review denied 103 Wash. 1038 (1985).
In the Thomas case, the plaintiff filed a libel action claiming he was defamed by
statements made by the defendant in a charge of discrimination the defendant had filed with the
EEOC. The court dismissed the defamation claim, holding that the EEOC was a quasi-judicial
body and that statements made during the course of such proceedings before the EEOC were
absolutely privileged. 465 N.E. 2d at 1061-64. Clearly this is a correct decision, as the EEOC
possesses all the necessary characteristics to be classified as a quasi-judicial entity. Id.
In the Hurst case, virtually identical to the case at hand, the plaintiff claimed he was
defamed by documents and statements provided by his former employer to the EEOC during the
course of the EEOC's investigation of the plaintiffs discrimination charge. The court
concluded that such statements were absolutely privileged and could not support a defamation
action. 697 P.2d at 282.
Other courts have reached the same conclusion when plaintiffs have used other tort
theories besides defamation, such as the tort of outrage, to try to impose liability for statements
made during the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. See Correllas v. Viveiros.
572 N.E.2d 7, 8 (Mass. 1991) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant because
statements made in judicial proceeding were absolutely privileged and thus could not support

131367.1
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either a defamation claim or a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Doe v.
Blake. 809 F. Supp. 1020, 1027-28 (D. Conn. 1992) (same).8
The same public policy reasons that support the absolute privilege as applied to a
defamation claim must preclude an "outrage" or similar tort or other claims that make the same
basic assertions based on privileged statements. To do otherwise would circumvent and
abrogate the absolute privilege that is necessary for judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings to be
conducted with the free and open expression required for resolution. Parties to litigation must
be able to give information uninhibited by the threat of lawsuits based on the information they
presented in the proceeding.9

8

This point is probably irrelevant to this appeal as the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs
post-judgment efforts to amend her Complaints to assert the tort of outrage is not even before
this Court as part of this appeal. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal expressly states that the
Judgment she appeals from is the December 23, 1994 Order and Judgment which dismissed
Plaintiffs first two Complaints that contained no reference to the tort of outrage. The court
ruled on the post-judgment motions later.
The same is true regarding Plaintiffs apparent effort (dated January 9, 1995) to assert
an age discrimination claim, a request made (in a notice to submit) over two weeks after the
entry of the December 23, 1994 Order and Judgment appealed from. Even if this issue is
somehow properly before this Court, however, Plaintiffs claim would fail. The right to sue
letter issued to Plaintiff on August 30, 1994 expressly required her to sue within 90 days or
lose her right to sue altogether. Thus to be timely, Plaintiffs claim for discrimination should
have been filed no later than December 1, 1994. Plaintiff clearly missed this filing deadline
and thus is precluded from pursuing this claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (". . . within
ninety days after the giving of such [right to sue] notice a civil action may be brought. . . .";
Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown. 466 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1984) (also concluding
at n. 3 that relation back provision of Rule 15(c) does not apply in circumstances of that
case); Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1979) (claim
brought beyond 90 days barred); Flaherty v. Illinois Department of Corrections.
F.
Supp.
, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6336, *4 (N.D. 111. 1995) ("pro se litigants must abide
by the filing requirements imposed by Congress").
9

131367.1

Moreover, the conduct alleged by Plaintiff is insufficient as a matter of law to support
(continued...)
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Accordingly, the trial court acted properly in not allowing Plaintiff to attempt to
impose tort liability on CNS for statements allegedly made by CNS to the EEOC investigator
deciding how to rule on Plaintiffs charges. This Court should affirm that decision made by the
trial court in this case.
II.

CNS SHOULD BE AWARDED APPROPRIATE COSTS AND DAMAGES
BECAUSE THIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS
For the reasons outlined above, this appeal is frivolous and completely without merit.

Plaintiff has also conducted this appeal in an ugly and insulting manner that should not be
tolerated even from a pro se litigant. Therefore, CNS respectfully requests that it be awarded
costs and damages under Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

9

(...continued)
any outrage tort cause of action. A similar situation arose in Hurst v. Farmer. 697 P.2d 280
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985). In that case, the court held that statements made by the
representatives of an employer during an EEOC proceeding were absolutely privileged. Id.
at 282. The plaintiff in Hurst also alleged the tort of outrage. Id. The court rejected the
claim as a matter of law, stating:
Aider's [the employer representative] conduct, as a matter of law, was
not so "extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community."
***

It should be noted that the employer was required by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act to investigate the complaints against Hurst
and the action taken was well within the spirit of that Act.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Howcroft v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.. 712 F. Supp. 1514,
1521-22 (D. Utah 1989) (mere termination does not constitute outrageous conduct to support
tort); Larson v. Svsco Corp.. 767 P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1989) (same).
As in Hurst, here CNS was required to investigate and respond to the allegations and
charge filed by Plaintiff and it did so well within in the spirit of the law. Thus, CNS'
actions are privileged and do not support any claim of the tort of outrage.
131367.1

14

CONCLUSIONS
Because CNS's statements were allegedly made during the course of and plainly
relevant to the EEOC proceeding initiated by Plaintiff, and thus are absolutely privileged,
Plaintiffs claim in this case fails, the trial court acted properly in dismissing it and there is no
substantial basis for any review of that decision. Accordingly, CNS respectfully requests this
Court to affirm the decision of the trial court, dismiss Plaintiffs appeal, and award appropriate
costs and damages.
DATED this &'

day of July, 1995.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDOJtfOUGH

Michael Patrick O'Brien
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Community
Nursing Services

131367 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (/*' -^

day of July, 1995 I caused to be mailed, postage

prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S/DEFENDANT'S BRIEF,
to the following:
Theresa F. Thompson
Plaintiff Pro Se
Box 786
Park Valley, Utah 84329

%kUd m*dc S&n^

131367.1
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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Phoenix District Office

Phoenix District office
4520 N. Cemrai Avenue, Suite 300
Phoenix, AZ 850121848
(602) 640-5000

Charge No. 3 5 0 9 4 - 0 1 1 5
Theresa F. Thompson
P. 0. Box 786
Park Valley, UT 84329

Charging Party

Community Nursing Services
3050 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Respondent

D E T E R M I N A T I O N
Under the authority vested in me by the Commission, I issue the
following determination as to the merits of the above cited charge.
All requirements for coverage have been met.
Charging Party
alleged that she was discriminated against in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, in
that she was harassed by being issued written warnings and
terminated from her position as PRN due to her age, 53, and in
retaliation for complaining about harassment.
Examination of the evidence indicates Charging Party was terminated
from the position of PRN because of unsatisfactory job performance.
Records show that Charging Party was issued numerous written and
verbal warnings regarding her job performance, including two
written warnings issued prior to her complaint of harassment. The
evidence shows that persons over the age of 40 continue to be
employed and employees under the age of 40 have been terminated.
Further evidence reveals that Charging Party was hired at the age
of 52 and terminated at 53. There was no evidence to indicate that
age was a factor in the decision to terminate Charging Party.
Additionally, while Charging Party alleges discrimination under
Title VII. of ^ the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the
investigati** did not substantiate any violation under this Act.
Based oifJ&SS* analysis, I have determined that the evidence
obtained dftriay the investigation does not establish a violation of
the statu€*(*]K.
This determination and dismissal concludes the processing of this
charge. This letter will be the only notice of dismissal and the
only notice of the Charging Party's right to sue sent by the
Commission. Following this dismissal, the Charging Party may only
pursue this matter by filing suit against the Respondent named in
the charge within 90 days of receipt of this letter. Otherwise,
the Charging Party's right to sue will be lost.

If the charge was filed within 300 days of the alleged
discrimination, Charging Party may sue under the ADEA for recovery
of backpay, an equal amount as liquidated damages, appropriate
make-whole or injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and court
costs.

AUG 301994

Date

,

IL., 14,,

jft/Charlel?, D. <Burtner
» District Director

OCT-14-1994

12:38

THERESA F. THOMPSON
PLAINTIFF REPRESENTING SELF
BOX 786
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 84329
NO PHONE

EXHIBIT "B"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THERESA F. THOMPSON,

COMPLAINT FOR FINANCIAL LOSS AND
SEVERE EMOTIONAL AND PHYSICAL STRESS FOR:

DEFAMATION OF PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
CHARACTER

Plaintiff,

vs.

COMMUNITY NURSING

SERVICE/HOSPICE

Judge
Defendant.

T^

UfcTfrorvi^

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Theresa F. Thompson, as and for a FIRST CAUSE
OF ACTION against the Defendants for DEFAMATION OF PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
CHARACTER, and alleges:
1-

Plaintiff, Theresa F. Thompson, lives and resides at 62,335 West

Dove Creek Road, Park Valley, Box Elder County, Utah.
2.

Defendant, Community Nursing Service/Hospice, a Home Health Agency,

is licensed by theState of U t a h — h a v i n g its principal place of operations
in Salt Lake County with main office at 2970 South Main, South Salt Lake
City, Utah 84115.
3.

The events described herein originated in Salt Lake County.

DCT-14-1994

12:38
P.04/10

4.

The matter in controversy exceeds9 exclusive of interest and costs

the sum of Cen thousand dollars.
5.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from January 2, 1991 until

on or about March 22, 1993 as a visiting Registered Nurse>
6.

Because of harassment by a supervisor, Plaintiff tried five times

during 1991 to change employers but without sucess.
7.

Plaintiff's employment was terminated by Defendant in March, 1993.

8.

Plaintiff filed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission in Phoenix, Arizona.
9.

On or around the 15th of August, 1994, Sharon Hencky, investigator

for the EEOC, contacted the Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's charges of:
1)

treating client in an uncaring, dangerous manner;

appearance;

3)

insubordination;

4)

2)

filthy, unkemp

substandard performance;

5)

poor

interpersonal relationships.
10.

Since Plaintiff had not heard these charges or the half truths

and outright lies that had been used to support these charges before, Plaintiff
was thrown into severe emotional stress that contributed to an acute episode
of diverticulitis that landed Plaintiff in Logan Hospital for nine days •
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants for defamation
of personal and professional character leading to:
2)

loss of professional reputation;

physical and emotional stress;

3)

1)

loss of employment;

loss of personal reputation, 4) severe

the sum of $ 3,000,000 (three million dollars).

^Jwuq^

y

-^M^k^^^

Plaintiff representing self
Plaintiff's Name and Address
Theresa F. Thompson
Box 786
Park Valley, Utah 84329

2
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THERESA F. THOMPSON
PLAINTIFF REPRESENTING SELF
BOX 786
PARK VALLEV, UTAH 04329
NO PHONE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THERESA F. THOMPSON,
AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,

COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE

Civil No. 940906495 CV

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant-

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs Theresa F. Thompson to amend the Complaint by adding
the following:
11)

Plaintiff charges Defendant with making defamatory remarks

in writing and verbally about Plaintiff's appearance, compassion towards
other people, ability to cooperate with others, professional performance,
ability to relate to other people, intellect and education.
WHEREFORE/ Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant for:
1) an additional $ 2,000,000 (two million-dollars) for a total
of $ 5,000,000 (five million dollars)
2)

all court and lawyer fees.

Theresa F. Thompsor
Plaintiff representing self

OCT-21-1994

P.02/03

14:56

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing
Amendment to Complaint by certified mail prepaid to:
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE
2970 South Main
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84115
DATED this

/£

d«y of

fid&l~

19 *f.

Theresa F. Thompson

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
THOMPSON, THERESA F
PLAINTIFF
VS
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 940906495 CV
DATE 12/12/94
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK CLB

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

PURSUANT TO THE HEARING HELD DECEMBER 12, 1994, THE COURT
RULES AS FOLLOWS:
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTION HEREIN TREATED AS SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS ARE CONSIDERED IS GRANTED
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE SUPPORTING MEMORANDA.
2. COUNSEL FOR MOVANT TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE ORDER
AND JUDGMENT.

Case No: 940906495 CV
Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the

\ ^

day of

1><T ,

P^H ,

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
THERESA F THOMPSON
Plaintiff
BOX 786
PARK VALLEY DT 84329

MICHAEL PATRICK OBRIEN
Atty for Defendant
1500 FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZA
170 SO MAIN, P.O. BOX 45444
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0444
District Court Cleric

By:

1

fV.ftg\w!&l|.
Deputy ClerJ

CJAJ3.LDL

Michael Patrick O'Brien (USB #4894)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

1
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THERESA F. THOMPSON,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 940906495CV
vs.

:
(Judge J. Dennis Frederick)

COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE &
HOSPICE,

:

Defendant.
On December 12, 1994, the court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the above-captioned matter. Plaintiff appeared in person and represented herself. Defendant
Community Nursing Service & Hospice was represented by its counsel of record, Michael
Patrick O'Brien of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. The court, having reviewed the
written submissions of me parties, heard oral argument and issued a minute entry granting
Defendant's Motion, and for good cause shown;

108239.1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
A.

Defendant's Motion shall be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment.

B.

Based on the allegations in the Complaints and other submissions, the court

concludes that the statements alleged by the Plaintiffs Complaint and Amended Complaints
to create defamation liability are absolutely privileged statements because they: were made
during the course or judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings before the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), bore some reference to such EEOC
proceedings, and were made by parties, witnesses and/or litigants in such proceedings.
C.

Summary judgment is granted to Defendant on Plaintiffs Complaint and all

Amended Complaints, which are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

108239 1

/lyutay of December, 1994.

2

J^AH11511 "F"

BOX 786
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 84329
NO PHONE

IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T COURT OF SALT L A K E COUNTY
STATE OF U T A H

THERESA F. THOMPSON,

MOTION:

Plaintiff,

1 ) R E V E R S E JUDGMENT
2) AMEND COMPLAINT
3) REQUEST HEARING FOR ORAL
ARGUMENT

vs ,

COMMUNITY NURSING

SERVICE/HOSPICE,

Defendant,

Civil No. 940906495 CV

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Pursuant to Rules 52(b), 59, 60(b), and 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Plaintiff Theresa F. Thompson respectfully requests the Court:
1. To reverse the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.
2. To correctly name and charge elements in the Original Complaint.
12)

Plaintiff charges Defendant with providing false testamony in

an official proceeding, violation of Utah Codes Ann. sec. 76-8-502, 76-8-503,
and sec. 76-8-504.
13)

(See paragraph 10 of original complaint.)

Plaintiff charges Defendant with communication fraud, violation

of Utah Code, Ann. sec. 76-10-1801.
15)

Plaintiff charges Defendant with Tort of Outrage.

Complaint reads:

The Original

Complaint for Financial Loss and Severe Emotional and Physical

Stress for; Oefamation of Personal and Professional Chararacter.

In

addition to

the original $3,000,000 requested, the Plaintiff asks an additional $1,000,000

1

per day of hospital stay of nine days. ($9,000,000)
The basis of this Motion is that the original Complaint ( which is not
a charge of Defamation) was not addressed by the Defendant and justice has
not yet been served.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant her Motion.
DATED thisjr^day of 2 2 ^ S _ »

199A

•

T
Horncfl
Theresa

TT T
Vinmnenn
"
F.
Thompson
Plaintiff representing self,

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Motion
and Memorandum in Support of Motion to: Michael Patrick O'Brien
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

^jjl^*<^ ^-Jfarf***- /^</?Y
Theresa F. Thompson

Theresa F. Thompson
Box 786

Park Valley, Utah 84329
This Motion and Supporting Memorandum replaces and voids the Motion
and Supporting Memorandum filed on or about December 20, 1994,

^J**M^7^^***n^
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BOX 786
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 84329
NO PHONE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THERESA F. THOMPSON
REQUEST FOR DECISION
Plaintiff,
vs.

COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE,

Defendant.

Civil No. 940906495 CV

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Plaintiff requests that the Court rule on the following matters and
in the following ways pursuant to Rule 4-501 C.J.A. :
1. Tort of Outrage—Misunderstandings concerning the charge are based
on Plaintiff's use of the term"'defamation1.

Paragraph 10 of Original

ComplaintAdescribes false testamony about Plaintiff's character and events
but was defined by Plaintiff as 'defamation'.

Because the Charge: 1) does

not attempt to create a defamation liability; 2) is for extreme mental and
emotional harm created by the 'defamation' (false testamony)—the specific
statements made by Defendant are irrelevant (any false testamony would have
created the same stressful situation described in the MemorandumA; 3) and is
based on the fact that Defendant dared present false testamony to a Federal
Commission creating the stress leading to the harm described in Memorandum,
the Plaintiff requests a decision in her favor on the Tort of Outrage.

„ww_w.~w

*. w -.^
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UCLlUe

to grant or deny a claim to absolute privilege, Plaintiff requests a decision
against the Defendant's claim for absolute privilege based on the arguments in
the Memorandum and a judgment in the Defamation charge in favor of the Plaintiff
that justice may be served.
3.

Violation of Utah Codes Ann, sec. 76-8-502, 76-8-503, and sec. 76-8-504

and 76-10-1801:
4.

that Defendant be charged with these violations.

Discrimination and Harrassment by Defendant towards the Plaintiff

during her two years of employment by Defendant. This is the original charge
placed before the EEOC.

Plaintiff charges the Defendant's with this charge

now and asks relief in the amount of $2,000,000 (two million dollars)

Plaintiff

argues that if the Plaintiff needed to use false testamony to get a decision
in their favor by the EEOC, then the truth would have given a decision in
favor of the Plaintiff (Charging Party).(This Motion would have been requested
during an oral argument if a hearing had been granted.

Plaintiff has been

advised to place everything before the Court.)
Plaintiff respectfully requests a decision from the Court on each of
these matters.
lis
DATED thi

7

day of

<

"^^ / u ' , 1995,

Theresa F. Thompson
Plaintiff representing self

1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of Jthe foregoing Request
for Decision and Original Complaint and Amendment/*to:

^1 J
Theresa F. Thompson

Michael Patrick O'Brien
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

£j A X 1 J J L H X

Thirc^.cs: j . . ! C t

Micnaei Patrick O'Brien (USB #4894)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THERESA F. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
:
Civil No. 940906495CV

vs.

:
(Judge J. Dennis Frederick)

COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE &
HOSPICE,

:

Defendant.

On December 12, 1994, the court issued a minute entry granting summary
judgment to Defendant in the above-captioned matter. On December 23, 1994, the court
entered Final Judgment in favor of Defendant. After the court granted summary judgment,
Plaintiff filed various motions which appear to be motions for reconsideration and/or motions
to amend her dismissed complaint. Defendant has opposed all such motions. The court,
having reviewed all the written submissions of the panies and being fully informed about the

111228 1

XX

same and for good cause shown and having issued a minute entry on January 26, 1995
denying Plaintiffs Motions;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs motions are denied. The basis for
this denial are the reasons specified by Defendant in the various pleadings it has filed in
opposition 10 such motions.
DATED this

l ^ d a y of February, 1995.
BYTHEyfcOURT

rHonqrabWj. Dennis Frederick
tffrd EHstricy Court Judge •' / /
\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of January, 1995, I caused to be mailed,

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to the following:
Theresa F. Thompson
Plaintiff Pro Se
Box 786
Park Valley, Utah 84329

h^Qjdl
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THERESA F. THOMPSON
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT REPRESENTING SELF
BOX 786
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 84329
NO PHONE

FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THERESA F. THOMPSON,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE,

Civil No. 940906495 CV

Defendant and Appellee.

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, Theresa F. Thompson,
appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick

entered in this matter on December 23, 1994.

The appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
DATED t h i s ^ $ - day of j / ^ y

, 1995.

Theresa F. Thompson

Affidavit of Impecuniosity

Theresa F. Thompson
Box 786
Park Valley, Utah 84329
No phone
I, Theresa F. Thompson, do solemnly affirm that owing to my poverty
I am unable to bear the expenses of the appeal which I am about to take
and that I believe I am entitled to the relief sought by such appeal.

Date :

ZLl7j4ZT
Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to
tc before me on

frb- 1, WF5
date

JSm

signature
J signatu
Name and T&Jele of
Officer Authorized to
Administer Oath

NOTARY PUBLIC
OLENDAJ.LEB
1944 WM4C7S SOU*
Nvtftflto, Utcli S4406
Mf Commission Expire*
JflfMiary 2 8 . 1 f t *

STATE OF UTAH
References:
Sections 21-7-3 and 21-7-4, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended
Utah R. App. P. 6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EXHIBIT

J

1
2
3

THERESA F. THOMPSON,

}
Case No. CIV 940906495 CV

Plaintiff,

4
5

VS •

:
«

6

COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE,

j

7

Defendant.

'

REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPfr
OF PROCEEDINGS (MICHAEL
O'BRIEN'S ARGUMENTS ONLY)

8
9
10

REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

11

BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

12

on Monday, December 12, 1994

13
14
15

APPEARANCES:

16

For the Plaintiff;

THERESA F. THOMPSON
Pro Se

For the Defendant:

MICHAEL PATRICK O'BRIEN
Attorney at Law
170 South Main Street #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
521-3200

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR
License No. 22-106796-7801
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
535-5203
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1

I

2

** *
MR. O'BRIEN:

Your Honor, I don't want to take a

3

lot of time because our position is stated in the Memorandum,

4

but essentially, the background on this is that M s . Thompson

5

was employed by Community Nursing Service, and at one point

6

was discharged.

7

claiming age discrimination, and that matter was pending

8

before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

9

charge was investigated by the EEOC and one employee and one

10

former employee of Communit Nursing Service were interviewed

11

by the investigator.

12

Subsequent to that she filed a charge

That

Subsequent to that time, a ruling was issued by the

13

EEOC which is attached to the Memorandum.

14

concluded there was no reasonable cause to believe that

15

age discrimination led to M s . Thompson's discharge.

16 I
17
18
19

20

The ruling

After that ruling, Community Nursing was served with
this lawsuit which alleges that during the course of the EEOC
proceedings, M s . Thompson was defamed by statements made
about her.
This is a motion to dismiss.

For purposes, of

21

course, of this motion, we assume that the facts and the

22

statements in the Complaint are true.

23

that, your Honor, we believe that they should be dismissed

24

because they do seek to impose defamation liability for

25

statements made during the course of a quasi-judicial

Notwithstanding

proceeding which is absolutely privileged.
There are basically three points that need to be
met to establish this privilege and that's found in the
Allen v. Ortez case cited in our materials.
that —

let me just quote for the Court.

The first is

The statement

must have been made during the course of the judicial
proceeding.
There's no Utah case law that addresses the issue
of a quasi-judicial proceeding like the EEOC, but we have
attached to our Memorandum two cases, one from Washington
and one from Illinois that conclude the EEOC is a quasijudicial proceeding that qualifies for the privilege, and
there are various substantial other authorities that
indicate quasi-judicial proceedings qualify for the
privilege.
So we would submit, your Honor, the first prong
of the Allen test is met.

Second, the statement must have

some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding.
Now, the issue before the EEOC was whether or not
Ms. Thompson was discharged for legitimate reasons, or for
inappropriate reasons related to her age.

Therefore, there

was some need to respond to the investigator's questions
about the reasons for the discharge, the disciplinary
history, thB perceptions of the client toward the individual
All of Ms. Thompson's statements that she alleges are

3

1

defamatory relate to those sorts of issues and therefore,

2

they have some reference to the quasi-judicial proceeding

3

that was involved, and finally, the third prong, your Honor,

4

the privilege must have been made — excuse me. The

5

statement must have been made by someone acting in the

6

litigation, the judge, the juror, litigant or witness, and

7

there's no dispute here, I believe Ms. Thompson concedes,

8

that that prong is satisfied in this case.

9

Based on those three prongs and them being met in

10

this case in the face of the pleading, your Honor, we'd ask

11

that the lawsuit be dismissed.

Thank you.

* * *

12
13

THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. O'Brien?

14

MR. O'BRIEN:

15
16

to mention —

No, your Honor, except I did neglect

I apologize —

that the Complaint was

anended to assert two claims under the criminal code and we

17

would include that in our motion to dismiss, and then there

18

was a motion for protective order pending, but we don't

19

need to address that until the Court rules on the motion to

20

dismiss.

21
22
23
24
25

* * *

1
2 |

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

3
4
5

| STATE OF UTAH

6

| COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss
)

7
8

I

I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify

9

I

That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License

10

No. 22-106796-7801, and one of the official court reporters

11

of the state of Utah; that on the 12th day of Decembmer,

12

1994, I attended the within matter and reported in short-

13

I hand the proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my

14

' said shorthand proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting,

15

and the foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 4, inclusive,

16

constitute a full, true and correct account of certain

17

excerpted portions of the same, to the best of my ability

18
19

DATED AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, this 1st day of
February, 199 5.

20.
21

23

24
25

ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR

